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Applying Estonian Internet Voting Individual  Verification System to 
Other Electoral Systems 
Abstract: 
The current paper gives an overview of the Estonian internet voting individual verification 
system and introduces different ballot styles. It proposes and describes modifications to the 
Estonian system, so it could be used for individual verification with the introduced ballot 
styles and multiple elections. 
Keywords: 
Estonian internet voting, internet voting, individual verification 
Eesti interneti hääletamise individuaalse verifitseeritavuse süsteemi ühil-
damine teiste valimissüsteemidega 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Selles töös antakse ülevaade Eesti interneti hääletamise individuaalse verifitseeritavuse 
süsteemist ja tutvustatakse erinevaid valimissedeleid. Töös esitatakse ja selgitatakse muuda-
tused Eesti süsteemile, et seda oleks võimalik kasutada tutvustatud valimissedelite ja mitme 
korraga käimas oleva valimise individuaalseks verifitseerimiseks. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Eesti interneti-hääletamine, interneti-hääletamine, individuaalne verifitseeritavus 
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Introduction 
 
Estonia has been using internet voting as a secondary way of letting their citizens vote 
in elections since 2005. Over the years the popularity of it has risen and in the 2015 elections 
for the Riigikogu 30.5% [1] of the votes were given over the internet. In the year 2013 
individual verification was added to Estonia’s internet voting system [2], via smart device. 
Every i-voter can use the National Election Committees’ verification application to verify 
that their vote was sent to the vote storage server (VSS) with the correct choice.  
Estonia’s electoral systems ballot requires the voter to mark their most preferred choice 
in their voting district. Also there are no documented cases of having more than one election 
at the same time. The author of this thesis intends to find out whether a similar system with 
some modifications and assumptions for individual verification could be used for multiple 
elections at the same time and with more complex ballot styles.  
The thesis consists of three parts. In the first part Estonia’s internet voting and vote 
verification system is described. The second part of the thesis gives an overview of the dif-
ferent ballot styles considered. Third part describes the assumptions and modifications made 
for the protocol to support individual verification with multiple elections and more complex 
ballot style. A possible protocol is also described. 
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1. Estonian system 
In this chapter the Estonian internet voting individual verification is explained which 
works under following assumptions: 
1. The voter must have a computer with the voting application. 
2. The voter must have the right to vote. 
3. The voter must have an ID-card or Mobile-ID and the necessary PINs for  
authentication and signing. 
4. The voter must have a smart device with the verification application, internet 
access and camera. 
5. RSA-OAEP encryption system is used for encrypting the vote. 
6. The vote must be successfully cast and the vote reference must be transferred 
to the verification application via QR code [3]. 
7. The verification application must know the voting application’s public key. 
 
1.1 Vote casting 
As the thesis is interested in the verification of the voter’s choice, it is assumed that 
the voter is successfully authenticated and the voting application has received, Choices, the 
list of choices for his or her district. 
The voter makes his or her choice c and proceeds to sign with PIN. The application 
then adds padding to the choice c using RSA-OAEP [4] and randomness r. Then it encrypts 
the padded choice with the election public key and the encrypted vote is signed with the 
voter’s private key. The encrypted and signed vote EncSig(c) is sent to the vote forwarding 
server. The vote forwarding server then sends the received vote to the vote storage server. 
The vote storage server assigns a unique token, voteID, to the received vote and sends it 
back to the vote forwarding server that forwards voteID to the voting application. The ap-
plication displays a QR code containing r and voteID. Vote casting process can be seen on 
figure 1. 
 6 
 
 
Figure 1. Vote casting process 
 
 
Figure 2. Vote verification process 
1.2 Vote verification 
The voter can confirm that his or her vote was recorded as cast using a smart device 
application provided by the National Electoral Committee. The voter uses the application to 
scan the QR code displayed in the voting application to get r and voteID. The latter is sent 
to the vote forwarding server, which returns the encrypted vote Enc(c) and the choice list 
Choices. It then uses the scanned randomness r to encrypt every possible choice and com-
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pares the result with the encrypted vote v received from the server. If they match, the corre-
sponding choice is displayed and the voter checks it against his or her deliberate choice. 
Vote verification process can be seen on figure 2. 
The voter can vote multiple times, but only the last vote will be counted. The voter 
can perform verification up to three times and up to 30 minutes after voting. 
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2. Electoral systems and ballot styles 
An electoral system is the method used to translate the votes cast in an election into the 
number of seats acquired by individuals and parties. Reynolds and his colleagues [5] believe 
that the key elements of an electoral system are the electoral formula, the ballot structure 
and the district magnitude. First of them sets how the seat allocation is calculated, second 
states whether the voter votes for a party or a candidate and specifies the voter’s choice 
possibilities. Third defines how many seats every district elects. Ballot structure is what the 
current thesis is interested in. 
 
2.1 Simple ballot 
In case of a simple ballot the voter has a single choice. According to Reynolds et al. 
[5] simple ballot style is used in many different electoral systems such as first past the post, 
party block vote, the two-round system, list proportional representation and the single non-
transferable vote. Example ballot can be seen in figure 3. 
 
2.2 Multiple choice ballot 
Electoral systems using multiple choice ballot style allow the voter to make multiple 
choices, but not unlimited choices. Choice limit is declared by the electoral system in use. 
According to Reynolds et al. [5] approval ballot style is used by the Limited Vote and Block 
Vote. Example ballot can be seen in figure 4. 
 
2.3 Ranked ballot 
Ranked ballot requires the voter to rank the possible choices in order of preference. The 
preferences must be unique choices. Reynolds et al. [5] and Farrell [6] described this ballot 
style for electoral systems like alternative vote, the single transferable vote and Borda count. 
Example ballot can be seen in figure 5. 
 
 9 
 
 
Figure 3. A ballot paper from the UK 2010 General Election listing 8 candidates for The 
Hampstead and Kilburn constituency. [7] 
 
Figure 4. Ballot Template for the 2013 National and Local Elections in the Philippines. [8] 
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Figure 5. Minneapolis sample ballot 2013 [9] 
 
 
Figure 6. Cumulative vote ballot [10] 
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2.4 Cumulative ballot 
Cumulative ballot style gives the voters a certain amount of votes. The voter can distrib-
ute those votes as desired - all on once choice or spread in any other pattern between the 
possible choices. According to Farrell [6] cumulative ballot style is used in the cumulative 
vote. Example ballot can be seen in figure 6. 
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3. Unified protocol 
3.1 Standardizing ballots 
The different ballot styles viewed in the second paragraph can be standardized quite 
a lot. All the mentioned ballot styles can be viewed as multiple choice ballot: 
1. Simple ballot is a multiple choice ballot, where the voter can make a single 
choice. 
2. Preferential order ballot is a multiple choice ballot, where the order of the 
choices is fixed. 
3. Cumulative vote ballot is a multiple choice ballot, where the voter can choose 
the same choice multiple times. 
 
3.2 Assumptions 
In this chapter changes to the Estonian internet voting individual verification system 
needed for it to work with the described ballot styles are described and the assump-
tions are generalized. 
1. The voter must have a computer with the voting application. 
2. The voter must have the right to vote  
3. The voter must have the means necessary for a successful authentication and 
signing. 
4. The voter must have a smart device with the verification application, internet 
access and camera. 
5. A probabilistic public key encryption system must be used for encrypting the 
vote. 
6. The vote must be successfully cast and the vote reference must be transferred 
to the verification application via QR code. 
7. The verification application must know the voting applications public key. 
 
If a deterministic public key encryption would be used the cipher texts of the same 
choice would be same. Since there is a limited number of choices an eavesdropper can easily 
brute force the voters vote and the privacy of the vote would be broken. To protect the vote’s 
 13 
 
privacy a probabilistic public key encryption must be used to encrypt the voter’s choices. 
Public key encryption system is required so that the verification application could use the 
same public key and the provided randomness for the vote verification process.  
It is required that the vote verification process should not take too much time – e.g. 
more than 10 seconds. To speed up the vote verification process every choice is encrypted 
separately. This means that the worst case scenario for an election with multiple choice or 
preferential order ballot where there is n choices and r choices to be made is  ∑ 𝑛 − 𝑖𝑟−1𝑖=0  
encryptions. Whereas if all the selected choices were to be encrypted together there could 
be up to P(n, r) encryptions, because the order of the choices made by the voter is not 
known. In case of a cumulative vote ballot the worst case scenarios would respectively be 
∑ 𝑛𝑟𝑖=1  and 𝑛
𝑟 . It is easy to see, that when encrypting all the choices together, there is an 
exponential growth in the number of encryptions needed to find the voter’s choice.  
It would be practical to encrypt the choices separately. For every encryption a new 
randomness is needed, otherwise an adversary could gain information about the plain texts 
and the vote’s privacy would be broken.  
The Estonian system uses random, with a size of 160 bits, that is put into the QR code 
in hex encoding which results in 40 characters per random. This means that in case of an 
election where the voter has to make 10 choices the length of the QR code would exceed 
400 characters as the randoms are only a part of the data in the QR code. Older smart devices 
can have problems with scanning QR codes longer than 300 characters. This sets a limit to 
how much data can be put into the QR code. Depending on the encryption system used the 
length of the random varies, for example in ElGamal encryption system [12] the random is 
the same size as the key, which is suggested to be 2048 bits or 512 characters in hex encod-
ing.  
Instead of putting the randoms into the QR code it would be more efficient to generate 
one random seed for a randomness stretching function and use it in both, the voting and 
verification application. Randomness stretching function takes a seed and stretches it to 
given length and the results from the same seed and to same length are the same. With 
randomness stretching the amount of characters in the QR code could be reduced a large 
margin.  
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3.3 Suggested protocol 
It can be assumed that the voter is successfully authenticated and is given valid tokens 
that are needed to send the vote to the vote forwarding server. In addition, only the parts that 
are relevant to the vote verification are mentioned.  
After adding the introduced changes the following protocol is suggested. It is believed 
that it could be used for individual verification for most of the commonly used electoral 
system ballot styles. 
 
3.3.1     Vote casting 
Figure 7 shows the process for casting a vote. Voting application has received the 
choice list Choices from the choice list server. The voter makes 0 to n choices C1, ..., Cn 
where n is the maximum number of choices granted. 
Choices are padded to 2048 bits. A random R is generated, this R is stretched with 
the SHA-256 [11] function to generate randoms R1, ..., Rn, one for every choice. Padded 
choices are encrypted with the ElGamal encryption system using random from R1, ..., Rn, 
resulting in cipher texts of two integers αi and βi, where i = [1, ..., n]. If voter does not 
use all the granted choices the remaining choices will be encrypted as an empty string.  
Integers αi and βi, where i = [1, ..., n] are then put into ASN.1 [13] notation that 
can be seen in the figure 8. 
The application then submits the vote with all the necessary tokens to VFS. VFS 
validates the tokens and the vote. VFS then forwards them to the vote storage server. 
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 Figure 7. Vote casting process 
 
The vote storage server saves the received vote and answers with voteID. VFS for-
wards the voteID to the voting application that generates a QR code for the vote verification. 
The QR code contents can be seen in the figure 9. 
 
 
Vote::= SEQUENCE { 
 C1::= SEQUENCE { 
  α1 INTEGER, 
  β1 INTEGER, 
 }, 
 
 ... , 
 
 Cn::= SEQUENCE { 
  αn INTEGER, 
  βn INTEGER, 
 } 
} 
Figure 8. Used ASN.1 notation for cipher text 
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QR = voterID LF voteID LF random 
 
voterID – token received from authentication server 
voteID – hash received from the vote storage server (via VFS) 
random – random that was used to for SHA-3 stretching 
 
Figure 9. Contents of the QR code 
 
3.3.2     Vote verification 
 
The verification application on a smart device that is connected to the internet is used 
to scan the QR code provided by the voting application. The QR code is verified and vot-
erID with additional information from the application configurations are used to request the 
choice list from the choice list server. It then uses voteID and voterID to receive the vote 
v from the vote storage server (via VFS). If the vote storage server does not find a vote with 
voteID error is returned and displayed in the verification application (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Vote verification process 
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 The application then uses the SHA-256 stretching function on the random provided 
in the QR code to generate randoms R1, ..., Rn, where n is the maximum number of choices 
granted. These randoms are then used to encrypt all the choices C1, ..., Ck on the choices 
list, where k is the number of choices on the choice list. Pseudo code in figure 11 is used to 
find the matches. 
 
 
choicesList = [C1, ..., Ck] 
encryptedChoices = [(α1 , β1), ..., (αn , βn)] 
randoms = [R1, ..., Rn] 
matches = [] 
i = 0 
for encryptedChoice in encryptedChoices { 
 if encrypt(“”, randoms[i]) == encryptedChoice { 
  break  
 } 
 hasMatch = false 
 for choice in choicesList { 
  bruteforce = encrypt(choice, randoms[i]) 
  if bruteforce == encryptedChoice { 
   matches.push(choice) 
   hasMatch = true 
  } 
 } 
 if !hasMatch { 
  return Error(“”) 
 } 
 i++ 
} 
if len(matches) < 1 { 
 print(“No matching candidate found”) 
} 
for match in matches { 
 print(match) 
} 
    
Figure 11. Pseudo code for identifying voter choices 
 18 
 
Since the leftover choices are encrypted as empty strings and they are encrypted 
after the made choices it can be assumed that after matching an encryption of an empty 
string there are no more choices made by the voter. When all the choices have been identi-
fied they are displayed in the application. 
 
3.4 Multiple elections  
There are countries where multiple elections are held at the same time. To support all 
elections at the same time some additions to the protocol have to be made. For every con-
currently running election there can either be a separate set of servers or a shared server with 
assigned ports for different elections. The latter will definitely be a cheaper option.  
Only the differences to the single election protocol will be brought out. All elections 
have their own choice list Choices1, …, Choicesk , where k is the number of elections that 
the voter takes part in. The voter makes his or her choices for every election.  
Like before, a random R is generated, but the way it is stretched is different. Every 
election gives the voter a certain amount of choices n1, …, nk, where k is the number of 
elections that the voter takes part in. The random R is stretched with SHA-256 stretching 
function to generate R1, …, Rn1+1, where the first n1 are used to encrypt the voters choices 
for the first election he or she takes part in and the last random Rn1+1 is used as the input for 
the next election random stretching function and so on for all the elections. Stretching in the 
verification application is changed the same way. 
Encrypted choices per election are put into the ASN.1 notation as described in figure 
9 and sent to the vote storage server (via VFS). The vote storage server assigns a unique 
voteID to the received vote and sends it back to the voting application. After all the votes 
have been successfully sent a QR code is generated for the voter to use for the vote verifi-
cation. The QR code contents can be seen in the figure 12.  
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QR = voterID LF [voteID1, …, voteIDk] LF random 
 
voterID – token received from authentication server 
voteID – hash received from the vote storage server (via VFS) 
k – number of elections the voter took part in  
random – random that was used to for SHA-3 stretching 
 
Figure 12. Contents of the QR code 
 
As the length of the content in the QR code is important, it could be further shortened 
by replacing the voteIDs with a single unique hash, that when sent to the VFS is responded 
with the list of voteIDs. Another possible way to shorten the content of the QR code is to 
split it into many different QR codes. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of the current thesis was to find out whether the individual verification pro-
tocol used in the Estonian internet voting system could be expanded for other electoral sys-
tems with different ballot styles. 
 The thesis explained how the Estonian individual verification works. In addition to 
that the different ballot styles used in local or national level worldwide were introduced and 
made clear. Changes and additions to the protocol were analysed and justified. Problems 
that had occurred were described and resolved. A possible protocol for individual verifica-
tion that could be used for the covered ballot styles was introduced as well as an extension 
for situations where multiple elections are held at the same time. 
 Estonian individual verification system can be modified to suit most of the com-
monly used electoral systems worldwide. 
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